This paper examines the effects that hedge fund activism has on existing bondholders by examining a comprehensive sample of corporate bonds for 253 U.S. firms targeted between 1996 and 2006. We find that 29 percent of these firms have their corporate credit rating lowered by a U.S. credit agency within one year of the initial 13D filing. This compares to 10 percent for a control sample of bonds within the same industry and initial credit rating. In addition, almost 50 percent of the sample bonds have their ratings discontinued within one year of the initial 13D filing. In terms of bond returns, we find a mean (median) -8.19 (-5.26) percent change in bond prices around the initial 13D filing date. To understand the reasons behind these changes in bond ratings and bond prices, we examine one-year changes in key ratios used by the rating agencies. Consistent with their bond rating criteria, we find statistically significant declines in profitability and cash on hand ratios, as well as significant increases in debt-based ratios. We conclude that the intervention of the hedge fund activist results in a short-term increase in the risk of the existing bondholder.
I. Introduction
This paper examines the effects that hedge fund activism has on existing bondholders for targeted firms. Previous studies concentrate primarily on target shareholder returns, consistently showing positive returns of 7 to 10 percent around the filing of the Schedule 13D (e.g., see Klein and Zur (2009) and Brav et al. (2008) ). One source behind these returns is that hedge funds elicit substantive financial changes in the target firms, often increasing leverage ratios and decreasing cash on hand within one year of the initial filing date. In addition, target firms often undertake major corporate governance changes as a result of the activism. For example, Klein and Zur (2009) document that 44 percent of hedge fund activism campaigns result in the hedge fund gaining at least one seat on the target's board of directors; Greenwood and Schor (2009) report that almost 30 percent of target firms eventually are acquired by an outsider within 18 months of the initial engagement. The question we propose is whether these changes have a positive or adverse effect on the firms' existing bondholders.
If the activism, on average, increases the expected value of the firm through better governance and/or higher future cash flows, then the activism should positively impact the existing bonds. However, if hedge fund activism increases the risk of the firm and/or reduces its future cash flows (even in the short-term), then the credit ratings and prices of existing bonds should decline.
We conduct an analysis of hedge fund activism on a comprehensive sample of corporate bonds for firms targeted between 1996 and 2006. Since hedge fund targets tend to be comparatively small in assets and market equity, relatively few targets have outstanding, rated corporate debt. Nevertheless, we find that from an original sample of 635 firms, 253 firms (40%) had at least one bond rated by Standard and Poors' (S&P), Moody's or Fitch in its capital structure in the period prior to the hedge fund investment.
Using Mergent-FISD on WRDS and Standard and Poors' RatingsDirect reports on issuer credit ratings, we find that 29 percent of these firms have their corporate credit rating lowered within one year of the initial 13D filing. This compares to 10 percent for a control sample of bonds within the same industry and initial credit rating. In addition, almost 50 percent of these bonds have their ratings discontinued within one year of the initial 13D filing. Thus, it appears that the intervention of the hedge fund activist results in a short-term increase in the risk of the existing bondholder.
To understand the reasons behind these reductions in bond credit ratings, we read through the available Standard and Poors' (S&P) RatingsDirect reports for all firms to ascertain the factors that credit analysts use to assess creditors' risk. These factors include accounting ratios, such as operating margins, debt ratios, and interest coverage, as well as accounting data, for example, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), net income total debt. We also derive a bond rating model using the factors cited in Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) as well as the ratios cited by S&P. We begin our analyses by fitting the bond rating model on a combined sample of activist targets and control firms. We find that, prior to the hedge fund initial 13D filing, there is no association between the bond's rating and whether the firm is a hedge fund activist target or a control firm. In contrast, we find that, one year after the Schedule 13D filing, the coefficient on the dummy variable separating the activist targets from the control sample firms is significantly negative, indicating that the advent of the activist results in a lower (more risky) bond rating. Next, we compare one-year changes in some key ratios for our sample and control firms. Consistent with the stated criteria, we find significant differences between groups in key ratios, with the sample firms being accompanied by a reduction in profitability, cash on hand, financial health and an increase in the relative amount of debt in the firm. We also examine changes in ratios by whether the firms were upgraded, downgraded or had no change in their bond ratings over the year following the hedge fund targeting date. We find some evidence of differences in the changes in ratios, specifically those relating to total debt and the financial health of the firms.
To investigate whether the bond market anticipates rating declines, we calculate bond price changes around the initial Schedule 13D disclosure. Overall, bondholders lose, on average, 8.2 percent of their wealth around the 13D filing date, compared to an average gain of 1.5 percent for the control sample's bonds. Differences in means (and medians) are significantly different at the 0.01 level, suggesting that the activism negatively impacts the bonds' values. Further, when we divide the bonds into eventual one-year downgrades, upgrades and no change in ratings, we find evidence to suggest that the market differentiates between subsequent rating reductions and non-reductions.
Bondholders lose, on average, 13.9 percent of their wealth for firms that subsequently have their bond ratings decreased, whereas bonds fall only 7.12 percent for firms that have bond ratings that remain the same, and rise by 1.06 percent for eventual upgrades.
Using an ANOVA test to test for differences in the means yields a significant F-statistic, supporting the hypothesis that the returns differ by outcome. Further, preliminary tests on whether the reduction in bondholder wealth is due to a subsequent deterioration in future value or to an expropriation of wealth from the bondholder to the shareholder yield results consistent with the latter interpretation.
Overall, the results in this study are consistent with the view that hedge fund activism is not, on average, beneficial in the short-term to existing bondholders. Specifically, we find evidence that key liquidity, debt, and profitability factors decline in the short-run, thus adding risk to the firm as a whole and to the existing bondholder in particular. As Panel A shows, there was a rise in the incidence of hedge fund activism over time, a finding consistent with previous longitudinal studies (e.g., Brav et al. (2008) ). In Panel B, we present the bond ratings in the period prior to the initial 13D filing. These ratings are taken from the WRDS Mergent-FISD file or directly from S&P's RatingsDirect reports. We note that the ratings agencies are invited initially to rate a firm's bonds and will change the ratings when they believe that circumstances warrant the upgrade or downgrade of the bond's risk. Thus, the ratings in Panel B vary from 0 to 12 months prior to the initial 13D filing. Prior to the 13D filing, 190 of the 253 bonds (75 percent) were rated BB+/Ba1/BB+ or below (non-investment grade), with only 63 bonds (25 percent) rated BBB-/Baa3/BBB-or above (investment grade). 4 Therefore, most of the bonds in the sample can be considered speculative grade prior to the advent of the 13D filing. No bond is rated A+/A1/A+ or above; similarly, no bond is in default at the time of the filing.
II. Hedge Fund Activism: Sample Selection and Data Description
We also create a sample of matching seasoned bonds. Specifically, we choose a seasoned bond from the same Fama-French 48 industry classification that has the same bond rating as the activist target bond on the initial 13D filing date and a similar marketto-book ratio. This yields a sample of 253 bonds with the same yearly breakdown and bond ratings as shown in Panels A and B. We refer to this sample as the control sample throughout the study.
III. Changes in Bond Ratings After the Hedge Fund Invests in the Firm
We begin our investigation into possible effects of hedge fund activism on existing bondholders by examining ex post changes in bond ratings in the one year period following the initial 13D filing. The results are contained in where LTD/TA = long-term debt/total assets, both measured at fiscal year end; TA = total assets; Subordination = dummy variable equal to one if the bond is subordinated;
and zero otherwise, and σ M = standard deviation of the error terms from an OLS regression for the Sharpe market model using 60 monthly observations. For their sample of 120 seasoned bonds, Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) find that higher rated (less risky) bonds are negatively related to the long-term debt-to-assets ratio, to whether the bond is subordinated and to the firm's unsystematic risk, and are positively related to the total assets of the firm. Kaplan and Urwitz report a 62 percent concordance between the predicted bond rating and the actual bond rating for their sample of new-issue bonds.
We modify their model in two ways. First, we use the natural log of TA instead of total assets as an independent variable. Second, to examine the effect of hedge fund activism on bond ratings, we add a dummy variable, hedge fund activism, as a separate independent variable. Our final model is:
where i is firm i, α ki is an intercept term for each bond rating k, ε i is the error term for the estimation model and the other terms are defined as before and HFA is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a hedge fund target and zero if the firm is in the control sample.
We use an ordinal logistic model to estimate equation (2) The second bond rating prediction model is based on variables suggested by Standard and Poors' DirectRatings Reports. These reports contain detailed information on the reasons behind the individual firms' ratings. Each report is written by the primary credit analyst for the firm and contains, at a minimum, sections on "major rating factors,"
"rationale" (for the rating), and "outlook." The reports also present a history of the firm's corporate and bond credit ratings. Sometimes, but infrequently, when a bond is upgraded or downgraded, the reports contain explicit reasons for the ratings change. Table 3 Twenty-one reports explicitly present reasons behind the analyst's decision to downgrade in the company's credit rating. As Panel C shows, many of these credit declines are due to legal or structural changes in the company, for example, current or possible violations of debt covenants, internal control weaknesses, or the firm spinning off or divesting some of its assets. Four reports specifically mention declines in operating performance as a reason behind the ratings reduction.
Based on these reports, we use ordinal logistic regressions to estimate bond ratings using the most frequently mentioned accounting ratios from Panel B. Specifically, we estimate:
Where TD = total debt, defined as short-term plus long-term debt; EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; Interest Coverage Ratio = earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expenses, Operating Margin = EBITDA divided by net sales, and the other variables are defined as before.
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Our combined model includes both the Kaplan and Urwitz and the S&P independent variables. That is:
B. Empirical Results
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the independent variables used in equations (2) through (4). We present the data for the hedge fund and control firms.
Recall that we match firms by industry and initial bond ratings. 9 We alternatively use TD/EBITDA as the debt variable, but find that it is less significant than the Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) debt measure.
We also present the mean and median values for the control sample. An interesting finding is that, with exception of the mean operating margin, there are no statistically significant differences between target and control firms in terms of assets, long-term debt to assets, cash to assets, EBITDA/Assets, interest coverage ratio, the median operating market and the market-to-book ratio. These findings suggest that matching firms by industry, market-to-book ratios and a priori bond ratings may be equivalent to matching by these other accounting and financial ratios.
10 Table 5 In column (2), we add the hedge fund activism variable; we find it to be insignificantly different from zero. This finding suggests no a priori association between bond ratings and hedge fund activism. In addition, comparisons between the coefficients and Chi-square values for the other independent variables suggest little to no association between the future hedge fund activism and the bonds' risk factors. These findings are consistent with those reported in Table 4 , which demonstrates no significant differences in the means or medians of the Kaplan and Urwitz independent variables between hedge fund target and control firms.
In columns (3) and (4), we estimate the S&P derived model for bond ratings. For this model, the coefficients on cash and interest coverage ratio are significantly positive, suggesting that bond ratings are positively impacted by cash and the ability to pay shortterm interest. The coefficient on the operating margin is significantly negative, a result that is intuitively inconsistent with expectations. We also find an insignificantly negative coefficient on Total Debt-to-EBDITA. The concordance percentages for the S&P model are lower than that reported for the Kaplan and Urwitz models, 55.9 and 57.6 percent vs.
66.8 and 67.7 percent suggesting that the S&P derived model may be an inferior predictor of bond ratings than the Kaplan and Urwitz model. The coefficient on HFA in column (4) is insignificantly negative, a finding consistent with the Kaplan and Urwitz formulation, suggesting again that there is no association between current bond ratings and future hedge fund activism.
In columns (5) and (6), we present the combined model and find evidence that both the Kaplan and Urwitz and the S&P derived models contribute explanatory value to predicting bond ratings. From the Kaplan and Urwitz model, long-term debt and total assets retain their significance levels and that their coefficients differ little from those presented in columns (1) and (2). From the S&P derived model, the coefficients on cash and the operating margin are significantly different from zero, with the coefficients on operating margin being similar to those presented in columns (3) and (4). Again, HFA is insignificantly different from zero. Comparisons with the other models show that the percent concordant increases to 73.6 percent for model (5) and 68.8 percent for column (6).
Columns (7) through (12) present the regression results for the year after the 13D filing. As Table 2 showed, many of the ratings on these bonds changed over the year since the activists' intervention. Two major conclusions can be gleaned from these estimations. First, for all three models, the coefficients and significance levels on the explanatory are consistent with those reported in columns (1) through (6). Second, the coefficient on HFA is significantly negative, supporting the view that ceteris paribus the advent of a hedge fund activist results in a lower bond rating for a firm within one year of the intervention. Thus, we conclude that hedge fund activism is associated with a subsequent deterioration in the bond's rating.
In Panel B, we include all 253 bonds and their control firms. The full sample includes those bonds that discontinue their ratings within one year of the 13D filing date.
For these bonds, we use the latest bond rating as a proxy for the post 13D filing date bond rating. The findings with this enlarged sample are similar to those reported for the smaller sample. First, the three models capture the bond ratings process fairly successfully, with the Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) model outperforming the S&P derived model in terms of concordance. Second, the coefficient on HFA is insignificantly different from zero in the prior period (columns 2, 4 and 6), but is significantly negative in the post 13D period (columns 8, 10 and 12). We do note, however, that the results with the full sample are somewhat weaker than those reported in Panel A, suggesting that there might be some errors in our bond ratings as implied by the rating stoppage and/or the two samples may not be rated the same way. Nevertheless, the results in Table 5 support the view that hedge fund activism is associated with a subsequent deterioration in the firm's bond ratings.
V. Changes in Accounting Ratios
In this section, we examine one-year changes in various accounting and financial ratios and values for the fiscal year following the initial 13D filing. We conduct this analysis for two primary reasons. First, Klein and Zur (2009) and Brav et al. (2008) present evidence that hedge fund activists change the complexion of the target firm in many ways. Specifically, within a year of the initial 13D filing, these changes include increases in debt-to-assets, dividend payout ratios, CEO turnover, and reductions in cash on hand and operating performance measures. Their findings suggest that the cash and risk profiles of hedge fund targets change in a way that might be disadvantageous to existing bondholders. However, neither study dichotomizes their sample on whether the firm has seasoned, publicly-traded debt. In this section, we do that analysis. Second, the results reported thus far in this study suggest deleterious changes in accounting and financial ratios that are key to bond risk. By examining the one-year changes in ratios, we can glean some evidence as from where the changes are coming.
We conduct our analyses initially by comparing changes in accounting ratios between the sample of hedge fund targets and the control firms for our sample of firms that have bonds with bond ratings both before and after the 13D filing. We then compare the changes in accounting ratios among target firms that had rating increases, decreases, and no rating changes. Our first hypothesis is that the sample firms will have greater adverse changes in profitability, debt, and cash ratios than the control firms. Our second hypothesis is that there will be distinct, significant differences in the change in ratios among the three ultimate outcomes (upgrades/downgrades/no change). Table 6 presents one-year changes for various accounting ratios, where the change is the difference in the ratio from the fiscal year ending after the initial Schedule 13D and the fiscal year immediately prior to the filing. All data are from Compustat.
A. Changes in Accounting Ratios: Sample vs. Control Firms
The ratios examined are based on the Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) model, the criteria used by Standards and Poors' as delineated in Table 3 , as well as other accounting ratios examined in the accounting and financial literature.
We divide the ratios into six generic categories: profitability, debt, cash on hand, ability to pay off debt and interest, discretionary spending and other ratios. Column (1) contains the mean [median] ratios for the sample firms; column (2) presents the mean
[median] ratios for the control firms. We test for differences between columns (1) and (2) and indicate through asterisks whether the mean or medians are different between samples. For all tests, the difference in means yields a t-statistic, assuming unequal variances between samples. The difference in sample medians is from a Wilcoxon signed rank test, which does not require the assumption that the populations are normally distributed, and yields a Z-statistic.
The findings in Table 7 , in general, are consistent with the proposition that hedge fund activists change the structure of the target firm in many ways that are harmful to existing shareholders. In terms of future profitability, there are statistically significant differences in the changes in EPS and EBITDA between the bond sample and control sample firms. In terms of debt, the debt-to-assets ratios, as measured by current, long-term, or total debt, rises in the year after the hedge fund 13D filing. In contrast, these ratios decline for the control sample. Testing for differences between the two samples result in statistically significant t-and z-statistics, thus providing evidence that total debt and hence the riskiness of the bonds on hand prior to the hedge fund activism increases in the year following the 13D filing.
When examining cash on hand, the mean [median] cash-to-asset ratio for the hedge fund activism sample declines by -0.015 [-0.004] , whereas the ratio changes by 0.005 [0.000] for the control sample. Similarly, when including short-term investments to the cash balances, 11 we find that cash (broadly defined) decreases for the bond sample, but increases for the control sample. Given that cash and cash equivalents balances are the second most commonly cited factor by S&P in determining their bond ratings (see Table 3 ), these findings are consistent with why many of these bonds were downgraded within a year.
We examine four ratios that help gauge the firm's ability to pay off its debt and interest. Three of these ratios, Total Debt/EBITDA, FFO/Debt and the interest coverage ratio are taken from the S&P rating agency. The fourth ratio, Altman's (1976) Z-score measures the risk of bankruptcy for an individual firm. We find an increase in the total debt-to-EBDITA ratio for the sample firms, but a decrease in the ratio for the control sample. Testing for differences between groups yields t-and z-statistics that are statistically significant at the 0.05 levels, respectively. As Table 3 indicates, the total debt-to-EBDITDA ratio is the most commonly cited ratio in the RatingsDirect documents, suggesting that the increase in this factor is partially responsible for the subsequent downgrading of many bonds in the sample. We also find a decline in the bond sample's we find no differences in the funds from operations-to-debt ratios between groups, and we report an anomalous improvement in the interest coverage ratio vis-à-vis the control group.
11 Cash is from the firm's balance sheet and, following generally accepted accounting rules (SFAS 95), is defined as cash plus interest-denominated investments with maturities of three-months or less. Cash plus short-term investments is defined as cash plus interest-denominated investments with maturities between three months and one year, or passive equity instruments. We include short-term investments since firms tend to place their excess cash in these securities 
B. Changes in Accounting Ratios: Comparison Among Upgrades, Downgrades and No

Changes in Bond Rating Firms
In Table 7 , we compare ratios across the hedge fund activism sample by whether the firm experiences a bond rating decrease, increase, or no rating change. To test whether the differences in mean changes across the three groups are different from each other, we perform an ANOVA across groups and report F-values and their significance levels in column 4. We find significantly different changes in one-year long term debt/assets and total debt/assets ratios among groups. In particular, we note that firms that eventually have their bonds downgraded experience large increases in both ratios when compared to the other two groups. We also find significantly different changes in the firms' Altman Z-scores, with eventual downgrades recording a mean change of -2.628, compared to a decrease of -0.138 for the "Same" group and 0.043 for those firms with bond upgrades. None of the other F-values are significant at the 0.10 level, although we find that in almost all cases, the ratios for the downgrades are consistent with an increase in default risk (in terms of profitability or cash on hand) .
VI. Bond Market Price Responses to Initial Activism
A. Changes in Bond Prices
Thus far, we document a large number of credit rating decreases within one year of the initial activism, as well as significant changes in accounting and financial ratios that are correlated with increased bond risk. However, our findings may be endogenous to how credit agencies rate their bonds, and may not be a reflection of how the market reacts to the initial activism. In this section, we examine the bond market response around the initial Schedule 13D filing. If most bonds are downgraded within a year, and if these downgrades have market-wide implications, our expectation is that the bond market, on average, will reduce the firm's bond prices around the initial filing.
Until recently, it was difficult to obtain accurate bond price data. This changed Venkataraman (2006) report that trade execution costs fell for both TRACE and non-TRACE bonds after the initiation of the TRACE reporting system, suggesting an increase in market transparency and a reduction in trading costs in corporate bonds.
We begin by calculating the change in bond prices for all listed bonds on the TRACE dataset. Due to missing data, we examine 61 companies only. Table 8 , Panel A contains the mean and median percent changes for the bond and the control samples. We report a mean bond return of -8.19 percent, significant at the 0.01 level and a median return of -5.26 percent, also significant at the 0.01 level. In contrast, the control sample's mean bond return is 1.54 percent, significant at the 0.10 level, and the median return is 2.14 percent, significant at the 0.05 level. 13 Testing for the difference in the means between the two samples yields a t-statistic of -3.88 (p-value < 0.01). The z-statistic for the difference in the medians is -4.20 (p-value < 0.01). Thus, we find evidence that the hedge fund activism results in a decline in the bond's trading value around the initial 13D filing date, and that this decline is significantly different than the return for the control sample's bonds.
We also examine bond returns by whether the bond rating was subsequently upgraded, downgraded, or had no change in bond rating within one year of the original 13D filing. As Panel A shows, for the 32 downgraded companies, the average bond return around the initial 13D filing date is -13.92 percent (p-value < 0.01). The median return is -13.07 percent; a Wilcoxon signed rank test yields a p-value less than 0.01, supporting the view that the market anticipates the subsequent downgrades (with error).
In contrast, the average bond return for the 10 upgraded bonds is 1.06 percent, and the median return is 2.52 percent. Neither return is significantly different at the 0.10 level.
Bonds that are neither up-nor downgraded experience mean (median) bond returns of -7.12 (6.42) percent; both are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 levels. When we test for the differences among groups, we get an F-value equal to 2.75, which is significant at the 0.10 level. Thus, there is evidence that the market anticipates (with error) the subsequent change in the firm's bond rating.
B. Expropriation from Bondholders to Shareholders
Klein and Zur (2009) that the market anticipates that the hedge fund activism will result eventually in an increase in overall firm value. Most germane to this study, Brav et al. (2008) rule out the alternative hypothesis that the significantly positive shareholder return is due to an expropriation from the bondholder to the shareholder. Their conclusion is based on comparing shareholder returns between targets that have no long-term debt to those with some long-term debt. They report mean abnormal shareholder returns of 9.46 percent for those firms with no long-term debt vs. 7.21 percent with those firms with some long-term debt.
In this section, we expand on Brav et al.'s analysis of whether an expropriation (or expected expropriation) from bondholder to stockholder exists around the 13D filing.
The abnormal stock return is the difference between its buy-and-hold stock return and the that there is a difference in the "event" window that is used among studies. Because stocks are traded every day, papers examining stock returns only can use set windows, for example [-10 , +10] to measure the immediate impact of the informational event that is studied. Bond prices do not trade daily -thus, to match shareholder returns to bondholder returns require that we use a specific window for each company that we examine. This will introduce noise and bias into the stock return measure. Second, we examine only 61 firms, a significantly smaller sample than that examined by Brav et al. (2008) or Klein and Zur (2009) , which may introduce some sample-selection bias into our metrics.
To account for these possible biases and noise in the data, we calculate abnormal stock returns for all firms in our sample of firms in which we have definitive data on both before and after bond ratings. Further, to calibrate how these shareholders fared around the Schedule 13D filing date, we calculate the abnormal returns for the time period of -10 days to +10 days around the filing date. These abnormal returns are reported in Panel B.
As the panel shows, the 21-day mean [median] abnormal stock return for the hedge fund target sample is 5.27 [4.91] percent, a finding that is more in line with those reported by Klein and Zur (2009) and Brav et al. (2008) . Further, when we dichotomize by eventual change in bond rating, we find no difference in means among the three groups. The mean and median abnormal returns range from 4.39 percent to 6.59 percent, and testing for differences among the means yields an insignificant F-value of 1.45. These findings suggest that an expropriation effect from bondholder to shareholder might be taking place, although we caution the reader that these results and interpretations are very preliminary.
VII. Summary and Initial Conclusions
We examine the impact that hedge fund activism has on 253 rated bonds for companies targeted between 1994 and 2006. Our results suggest, on average, bondholders are disadvantaged by the activism in the immediate and short-run. First, we find that within a year, 29 percent of the firms' credit ratings are downgraded and another 49 percent of the firms choose to discontinue rating coverage of their bonds. Next, we find that the bond market reacts negatively to the initial Schedule 13D filing for those bonds that are downgraded within a year. Downgraded bonds experience a 13.92 percent drop in bond prices around the 13D filing date, whereas eventually upgraded bonds have a 1.06 percent return and those bonds with no change in ratings have a 7.12 percent decrease in value. An ANOVA test for differences in means yield a statistically significant F-value, supporting the view that these returns are different from each other.
Using the S&P's credit reports and the Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) bond rating model as input as to what criteria are used to rate bonds, we examine whether the activism affects bond ratings in a positive or negative way. Consistent with the changes in bond ratings and the bond price changes, we find that hedge fund activism has a negative effect on bondholders, both in terms of subsequent bond ratings and in one-year changes in operating performance, leverage within the firm, cash on hand, financial health and future investments. We also find evidence that downgraded firms have lower Altman Z-scores and higher debt within one year of the initial activism than firms that do not have their bonds downgraded. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics This table reports 
Characteristics of Target and Control Firms Prior to the 13D Filing Date
This table summarizes characteristics of firms targeted by hedge funds and control sample (based on industry, initial credit rating and Market-to-Book Ratio). Ln(Total Assets) are the log of total assets of the company. Long-term Debt-to Assets is the ratio of sum of the long and short-term debt to total assets. (Cash + Short-term Investments)/Assets is the ratio of the sum of cash plus short-term investments to total assets. EBITDA/Assets is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by mean total assets, the latter defined as the average of beginning and ending total assets. Interest Coverage Ration is earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expenses. Operating Margin is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by sales. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of the stock's market value to the difference in the value of total assets and total liabilities. The last column shows the t-statistic (Z-statistic) testing for differences between sample and control's means (medians). significant at the 0.10 level. The variables are accounting data during (for flows) or on (for balances) the end of the year previous to the filing of the initial Schedule 13D. An asterisk before the variable name indicates that it is explicitly used by S&P in their DirectRatings report. EPS is earnings per share. ROA is EBITDA/Assets, which is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by mean total assets, the latter defined as the average of beginning and ending total assets. Operating Margin is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by sales. Sales is net sales. CFO/Assets is net cash flow from operating activities divided by mean total assets. Short-term Debt/Assets variable is the ratio of debt in current liabilities to total assets. Long-term Debt/Assets is total long-term debt divided by total assets. Total Debt/Assets is the ratio of sum of the long and short-term debt to total assets. Cash/Assets is cash on hand divided by total assets. (Cash plus Short-term Investments)/Assets is the ratio of the sum of cash plus short-term investments to total assets. FFO is funds from operations. Interest Coverage Ration is earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expenses. Z-Score uses the Altman (1968) model to determine the likelihood of bankruptcy amongst companies. CAPEX/Assets is capital expenditures less the sale of PP&E divided by mean total assets. R&D/Assets is research and development expense divided by mean total assets. Marketto-Book is the ratio of the stock's market value to the difference in the value of total assets and total liabilities. This table shows changes in bond and stock prices for the period immediately surrounding the initial Schedule 13D filing by the hedge fund activist. The changes in the bond price are calculated as percentage changes in the bond process based on the date from TRACE. The time period is between the last price published on TRACE before the filing of the Schedule 13D and the first price published after the filing date. The abnormal stock return is the size-adjusted return which is the difference between its buy-and-hold return for the time period, as explained above, and the return on the matched Fama-French 5 size portfolio as calculated on Eventus. In Panel B the time period is -10 days to +10 days around the Schedule 13D filing. 
